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The period from 1947 when Pakistan was created to the watershed of 1971 when East 
Pakistan split off to become Bangladesh is an important one for studying the 
determinants of industrial performance in the Indian subcontinent. On the one hand, 
despite substantial differences in the industrial policies of Pakistan and India, their 
rates of industrial growth were remarkably similar. On the other hand, while 
Pakistan’s authoritarian institutions had many features similar to contemporary East 
Asian states, in particular South Korea, its long run performance was much poorer 
than in the East Asian industrializers.  
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Table 1 summarizes the manufacturing performance of several East and South Asian 
countries. Comparable figures are only available for the sixties. Table 1 suggests that 
over the long term, Pakistan’s performance over this period was very similar to that of 
India with the exception of a burst of industrial growth in the early sixties under 
Ayub. In contrast, industrial growth rates in the East Asian countries have been 
consistently high. In the eighties and nineties industrial growth rates in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh remained at the long-run South Asian level of between five to ten per cent 
while the East Asian countries continued to industrialize rapidly.  
 
}
East Asia South Asia
South Korea Taiwan Pakistan
(West) (East)
India
1955-60
1960-65
1965-70
1950-55 NA
NA NA
NA
11.8 12.7
19.120.0
9.1
5.7
(11.1) (5.7)
(7.5) (6.9)
6.1
6.8
4.2
10.0
6.8
NANA
NANA
 
Table 1 Manufacturing Growth Rates in East and South Asia 
Sources: Griffin & Khan (1972) Table Intro.3, World Bank (1994b), World 
Development Report (1992), Taiwan Statistical Yearbook (various years), Chakravarty 
(1987): Table 5. Figures not available indicated by NA. 
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The high growth rates in manufacturing in Pakistan for 1950-55 are to some extent a 
statistical artefact as the country started from an exceptionally low industrial base in 
1947. Nevertheless, we need to examine how Pakistan managed to kick-start 
industrialization in this period given its unpropitious initial endowment. More 
significant is the acceleration in industrial growth rates in the early sixties when it 
adopted industrial policies that were initially quite similar to (and in fact pre-dated) 
South Korea. Nevertheless, unlike the East Asian states, Pakistan could only sustain 
high growth for a very brief period before reverting to the South Asian norm by the 
late sixties. The failure of Pakistan to sustain East Asian growth rates is therefore 
interesting in providing insights into the political economy of growth in the South 
Asian subcontinent. Was its failure due to policy errors or were there other constraints 
that made rapid industrial growth difficult to sustain? 
 
Section 1 identifies the issues raised. Economists looking at India and Pakistan have 
usually focussed on policies to account for relatively poor performance. However, 
most conventional explanations have important shortcomings. In particular, they are 
difficult to sustain in a comparative context if we look at India, Pakistan and the East 
Asian countries together. Convincing explanations of relative performance have to 
identify features which were common to the subcontinental countries but which 
distinguished them from the East Asian industrializers. We suggest an alternative 
explanation that looks at the economic effects of the growing conflicts within the 
middle classes over resources allocated by the state. This explanation focuses on a 
feature which India and Pakistan shared despite important regional variations. This 
was a shared tradition of political mobilization by emerging “middle” classes. Section 
2 looks at the early phase of Pakistan’s industrialization and Section 3 at the industrial 
policy period of the sixties. The sixties are particularly interesting because by 
comparing the high growth rates of the early sixties with the decline in performance in 
the late sixties we are able to test a number of competing hypotheses explaining poor 
industrial performance in Pakistan. 
 
The importance of the professional members of the middle classes was recognized by 
Bardhan (1984) who described them as an equal member of the dominant class 
coalition in India along with capitalists and landlords. In our use of the term “middle 
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class”, we would include not only the professional classes but also the much bigger 
group of educated and salaried sections of the population. These are groups who have 
some education, a little capital and who have organizational abilities that distinguish 
them from the broad masses of the poor. Not all of them are employed. The 
importance of these non-capitalist intermediate classes in subcontinental politics far 
outweighs their numbers that in any case would run into many tens of millions.  
 
It was precisely in terms of these inherited traditions of state-society interaction that 
Pakistan differed significantly from the East Asian countries and in particular South 
Korea. When Pakistan briefly attempted in the sixties to implement an exclusionary 
industrial policy, its evolution and results were quite different from that in South 
Korea. We argue that the social power of excluded groups and their ability to draw on 
traditions of incorporation and mobilization were important factors explaining why 
Pakistan performed so differently from South Korea despite the similarities in their 
policies and institutions. The mechanisms through which the social power of 
emerging “middle classes” translated into economic consequences are examined. This 
is also why Pakistan’s industrial performance in the long run is so similar to that of 
India despite the differences in their institutions and policies in the sixties. 
 
1. The Issues 
Pakistan’s early industrial development in the fifties was based on import substituting 
industrialization under tariff barriers and an overvalued exchange rate. After the first 
easy phase of import substituting industrialization, industrial strategies evolved into a 
more coherent industrial policy in the sixties under Ayub’s military regime which 
took over in 1958. Industrial credit was subsidized and its allocation was controlled 
by the state through two publicly owned industrial banks. At the same time, 
enterprises were set up in the public sector and subsequently divested as running 
ventures to the private sector. Incentives were offered to exporters under an 
innovative “Bonus Voucher” scheme to promote exports. This period produced some 
of the highest industrial growth rates ever enjoyed by either Pakistan or post-1971 
Bangladesh. Yet, the industrial policy of the sixties collapsed as political opposition to 
it grew in both East and West Pakistan. 
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The role of political opposition in West Pakistan in sealing the fate of industrial policy 
is often not recognized. While it is clear that the political crisis in the country led to 
Bangladesh’s war of independence and thereby terminated the industrial policy 
period, it is often not recognized that political mobilization had begun to affect the 
implementation of the policy as early as the mid-sixties. As a result, industrial policy 
in Pakistan would have been radically altered even in the absence of the dramatic 
events that followed. Moreover, even without the growing Bengali nationalism in East 
Pakistan led by Mujib and the Awami League, Bhutto and his Pakistan People’s Party 
in West Pakistan would probably have brought down Ayub’s industrial policy anyway 
and at about the same time. Indeed, opposition to Ayub began in West Pakistan and 
only subsequently spread to the East.  
 
Ayub’s industrial policy was a central target for the emerging middle classes who felt 
excluded by these policies. From the mid-sixties, their mobilization began to affect 
the implementation of the policy and began to reduce the rate of growth for reasons 
that we will carefully examine later. Eventually it led to its abandonment, though the 
dramatic way in which this actually happened had other determinants. In 1970 East 
Pakistani politicians won a majority in the first elections to an all-Pakistan parliament 
held under military rule. The subsequent attempt by Western political leaders 
(including Bhutto) and the military to prevent them from taking their seats without 
prior conditions led to the descent into civil war in 1971 which in turn escalated into 
Bangladesh’s war of independence.  
 
Political economists divide into two major groups when it comes to evaluating the 
experience of industrial policy in Asia in the fifties and sixties. “Statists” argue that 
industrial policy worked where states were strong, where they could act autonomously 
of sectional interests and where they had coherent policies and institutions. In contrast 
liberals argue that state intervention was largely unsuccessful everywhere. The true 
explanation of the relative success of East Asia was that intervention was relatively 
limited and where it happened it was “market friendly” serving to develop and 
promote markets rather than supplement them. Intervention on its own only induced 
rent-seeking behaviour and allowed efficiency-reducing free-riding by recipients of 
subsidies whose industries remained less efficient than they would otherwise have 
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been. 
 
An examination of the rise and fall of Pakistan's industrial policy in the context of the 
political and social changes which were happening in that country is interesting for an 
evaluation of these two positions. There is now considerable evidence from East Asia 
in favour of the statist perspective that differentiated incentives can help to 
significantly accelerate the creation of a capitalist sector based on advanced 
technologies and capable of competition on the world stage. While the proposition is 
in principle correct, it appears that the implementation of such strategies has been 
considerably more difficult in the South Asian countries.  
 
Despite differences in their institutions and policies, the state in both Pakistan and 
India tried to accelerate industrialization in the fifties and sixties by centrally 
allocating resources and creating incentives for the introduction of modern 
technologies. These policies did two sets of things. On the one hand, they excluded 
large middle class groups from the immediate benefits of development. On the other, 
their long-term viability depended on the successful imposition of discipline on the 
capitalist recipients of state subsidies. These two apparently unrelated features of the 
development strategy became strongly linked over time. The social and political 
features of the South Asian countries ruled out any sustained exclusion of the middle 
classes and the way in which their opposition was accommodated in turn 
compromised the efficiency of industrial policy. 
 
In India, their exclusion was never as dramatic as in Pakistan but in both countries, 
there were significant increases in the pressures for incorporation from the mid-sixties 
onwards. Because of these pressures, a significant proportion of subsidies and licenses 
had to be allocated in response to political demands rather than on rational economic 
criteria. This development had far-reaching implications for the effectiveness with 
which the state could police the allocation of subsidies to capitalists as well. As 
rational political actors, capitalists in the South Asian countries began to develop their 
affiliations with powerful political players who would protect their interests. As a 
result, while the East Asian states were evolving towards a carrot and stick approach 
to the capitalist sector in the mid-sixties, prodding them to ever greater productivity, 
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the stick was never attempted in the South Asian countries. This is particularly 
interesting in Pakistan where the state ostensibly had the authoritarian trappings to 
attempt such disciplining. In India, industrial policy of the Pakistani type was never 
attempted but even Nehruvian planning with its concessions to many more social 
demands proved eventually to be too difficult to administer by the late-sixties. By 
then the ability of the central state apparatus to implement policies had declined 
dramatically because of the ongoing processes of accommodating regional power 
brokers in a way remarkably similar to what was happening in Pakistan. 
 
If this explanation captures significant elements of the South Asian state failure story, 
both the statist and liberal interpretation of the strategies followed by Pakistan and 
India in the fifties and sixties have to be re-evaluated. The statist position stresses the 
importance of getting institutions and policies right. However, our explanation 
suggests that the problem may have been the incompatibility of Pakistan’s economic 
strategy with its underlying society and politics. If Pakistan’s industrial policy could 
not evolve in the South Korean direction this may have had less to do with policy 
errors of its leaders and more to do with the compromises induced by its social 
structure. If so, we need to ask whether some other type of policy which was more 
compatible with its social structure may have been more efficacious for technical 
progress and accumulation. In other words, if Pakistan’s political structure was 
incompatible with its economic strategy either one or both would have to change. 
Ayub attempted to change the polity. He introduced a new constitution, which aimed 
to undercut the urban middle class dominated political parties, and he aimed to make 
the possibility of repression credible. His successor Yahya Khan was forced into 
exercising repression on a large scale in an experiment that ultimately failed. The 
possibility of constructing an alternative economic and institutional strategy, which 
may have better achieved the objectives of technical progress and growth, were never 
discussed. 
 
The liberal argument seems to have been vindicated from the mid-seventies onwards 
as the three large subcontinental countries, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, have all 
converged towards liberalization. Moreover, performance has appeared to improve in 
all of them if only by a little. However, even if liberalization was responsible for this 
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better performance, this does not mean that the mechanisms identified by liberal 
economics are correct. If poor performance under statist policies was due not to the 
inherent irrationality of such policies but rather the costs of implementing them in the 
political context of the Indian subcontinent, liberalization may be producing better 
results simply be removing some economic activities from the domain of the state. 
Nevertheless, even liberal policies can only work if the state can efficiently provide a 
large chunk of public goods such as infrastructure and education. If political 
contestation over resource use was responsible for the failure of statist policies in the 
sixties, it may eventually result in no less serious problems for liberal strategies as 
well. Thus, the debate over why the statism of the fifties and sixties failed in both 
Pakistan and India may be of great relevance for our understanding of the future 
prospects of the subcontinental countries. 
 
2. The 1950s: Import-Substitution 
The early phase of import substituting industrialization in Pakistan describes the rapid 
growth of industries in the fifties. The context in which this happened was one of 
deepening political crisis. The émigré leadership of the Muslim League had its power 
base in northern and central India and had very weak political roots in the areas that 
constituted the new country of Pakistan. It was forced in 1947 to forge a viable 
nation-state out of the two non-contiguous territories that constituted Pakistan. 
Although the social structure of Pakistan was broadly similar to India's, it faced a 
number of special problems that created severe tensions between state and society and 
at the same time forced the state apparatus to play a more centralizing role.  
 
Three factors were particularly important in differentiating Pakistan from India in the 
immediate aftermath of independence. First, the level of development of industry in 
the areas that initially comprised Pakistan was exceptionally low. Secondly, the 
political and bureaucratic leadership felt militarily vulnerable and perceived the need 
to build up military capability at a much more rapid rate than their counterparts in 
India. Thirdly, the political and organizational base of the Muslim League, which 
formed the government, was exceptionally weak. The tensions created by the joint 
operation of these three factors largely determined the contours of early development 
strategies in Pakistan. We consider them in turn. 
 Industrial Underdevelopment. The areas of India out of which Pakistan was formed 
were overwhelmingly non-industrial. They were composed primarily of the raw 
material producing agrarian hinterland of India. East Bengal, which became East 
Pakistan, had previously supplied raw jute to the jute mills located around Calcutta. 
West Punjab, the most important component of West Pakistan, provided raw cotton to 
the Bombay cotton textile industry. Some figures will indicate the extent of economic 
backwardness that the new economy faced. At the time of partition, the two wings of 
Pakistan constituted 23 per cent of the land mass of India, possessed 18 per cent of its 
population but inherited less than 10 per cent of its industry (Jalal 1990: 64). It also 
possessed relatively little in the form of natural resources or known mineral deposits 
(important deposits of oil and gas were discovered much later). In short, the new state 
had been carved out of India’s agricultural hinterland.  
Table 2 Comparative Compositions of National Product: Pakistan and India 
                  Pakistan (East and West)                        India         
                        At 1960 factor cost and               At 1980 prices and
                        expressed as % of GNP           expressed as % of NDP
1950 1960 1970 1950 1970
Agriculture 60.0 53.3 44.4  50.1 41.8
Manufacturing  5.9 9.3 12.2  11.4 15.3
 (i) Large-Scale  1.4 5.0 9.0
 (ii) Small-Scale  4.4 4.3 3.2
Others 34.1 37.4 43.4  38.5 42.9  
Sources: Amjad (1982): Table 1.2, Indian National Accounts Statistics 1990. 
Table 2 shows that in 1950, agriculture accounted for 60% of the GNP of Pakistan 
while manufacturing accounted for only 5.9% of GNP. Large scale manufacturing 
accounted for a mere 1.4% of GNP. In comparison, in India in 1950 the share of 
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agriculture in NDP1 was 50.1% and the share of manufacturing was almost double 
that of Pakistan at 11.4%. Modern manufacturing in Pakistan was therefore roughly 
half as developed as in India even after adjusting for the smaller size of its economy. 
This difference had substantial implications. The low share of manufacturing and 
particularly of large-scale manufacturing meant there was no indigenous industrial 
capitalist class that could become a developmental partner of the state. It also meant 
that the state felt much more vulnerable militarily than its relatively low population 
alone would suggest.  
 
This explains why compared to India, the state in Pakistan took much more drastic 
steps to encourage primitive accumulation to create an entrepreneurial class. On the 
one hand it used the state machinery to create enterprises using bureaucrats as 
entrepreneurs and then sold these off at attractive prices. In addition, the state induced 
the emergence of a new capitalist class by providing exceptional incentives to the 
private sector. Thus, the state quite deliberately created the conditions that pushed a 
small group of merchants into industry in a short period in the early fifties. 
 
Military Threat Perception. Several authors have identified the perceived military 
threat in early Pakistan as an important factor determining the actions of state officials 
and politicians (for instance Jalal 1990). Rightly or wrongly, Pakistan did feel 
threatened by India’s overwhelming military superiority in the context of the 
bitterness and unresolved territorial disputes following partition. Pakistan inherited 30 
per cent of the defence forces of united India, which was more than proportionate to 
its population (Jalal 1995: 22) but it inherited much less than its share of weaponry 
and military hardware. Moreover, in conventional warfare, absolute numbers matter 
and Pakistan’s army was hopelessly outnumbered by its larger neighbour. Its military 
leaders not only felt the need to expand the army but also were also to become a 
powerful constituency supporting industrialization. They were eventually to take over 
the running of the country in 1958. However, while the threat perception was 
important and was no doubt nurtured by the military leadership, other factors were 
 
 1 Net Domestic Product. The sectoral shares in India’s Gross National Product 
(GNP) are not likely to be significantly different. 
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required to provoke the extreme centralization in economic policy-making that was 
beginning to emerge. 
 
The immediate consequence of the military imperative was to starve other sectors of 
funds. The demands on the budget to maintain an army that could begin to match 
India as well as protect the potentially vulnerable North-West placed intolerable 
strains on other sectors. India, it is worth recalling, was four times as populous as 
Pakistan and more industrially developed. The military imperative resulted in starving 
spending on social sectors. Jalal points out that in 1950-1 the central government of 
Pakistan could sanction a paltry Rs. 10m for provincial development programmes that 
included health and education. In contrast, India at that time was spending Rs 250 to 
300 million in provincial development programmes. Allowing for the factor of 5 by 
which India's population exceeded Pakistan's, its per capita spending on provincial 
development was 6 times larger compared to Pakistan (Jalal 1995: 22). This in turn 
meant that Pakistan's development could not be broadly based and the available 
resources were inevitably concentrated in a few hands where it was much more 
conspicuous. This was ultimately going to accelerate the mobilization of excluded 
“intermediate classes” in Pakistan much before the demands of similar classes 
gathered strength in India at a later stage. 
 
The Weak Political Roots of the Muslim League Leadership. The most important 
factor distinguishing Pakistan from India was the weak social base of the political 
elites who took over after independence. While the Congress Party in India had 
developed a nation-wide representative structure over a long period, the Muslim 
League in Pakistan lacked a similar political and organizational base in the areas that 
came to constitute Pakistan. Thus while the Congress Party could serve in the early 
years as an institutional mechanism for accommodating competing factions and 
interest groups, the Muslim League in Pakistan could not perform the same function.  
 
This difference is important. The Muslim League’s social and organizational strength 
was concentrated in the Muslim-minority provinces of middle India, such as the 
United Provinces and the Bombay Presidency from whence Jinnah himself came. The 
Muslim elites in these provinces feared they would be permanently swamped in a 
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future Hindu-dominated India and their fears provided a powerful motivation for a 
separate Muslim organization to demand constitutional guarantees for the Muslim 
minority. In contrast, the most important Muslim majority areas of India were Punjab 
and Bengal but in both these provinces, the Muslim elite were doing quite well in 
provincial politics. Although some of them belonged to the Muslim League, many 
others belonged to other parties. Most of them were not at all interested in the concept 
of a separate Pakistan at least until the early to mid-forties. 
 
In Bengal, an upcoming Muslim rich peasant class known as the jotedar class were 
challenging the economically dominant and more established Hindu landlord class of 
zamindars. As elsewhere, Bengal’s emerging Muslim “middle classes” demanded 
access to government jobs and places in educational establishments. Partition was not 
on the agenda for the bulk of the Muslim jotedars simply because it did not suit their 
economic aspirations. They had more to gain from exercising their majority position 
in a united Bengal. In the Punjab, the class distinction between Muslims, Hindus and 
Sikhs was not so clear cut but even here, the majority Muslims were less advanced in 
economic and social positions compared to the other communities. But as in Bengal, 
the Punjabi Muslim political elite were generally not separatists and did not believe 
they had much to gain from a partition of their province. 
 
If the Muslim-majority provinces were not separatist, the interesting question is 
whether Jinnah and the other leaders from the Muslim-minority provinces were. It is 
hard to see what these leaders had to gain from partition since even if they were to 
migrate; the millions of Muslims in the minority provinces who were their 
constituency were unlikely to do so. In fact, while this group frequently made 
separatist noises, they were equally frequently engaged in making deals with 
Congress that promised constitutional protection for minorities. The most coherent 
interpretation of Jinnah’s strategy was that he was attempting to obtain constitutional 
protection for the Muslims in the Muslim-minority provinces in exchange for 
appearing to deliver the Muslim-majority provinces of Bengal and Punjab to the 
Indian union (Jalal 1985). 
 
That this was really the Muslim League’s goal is supported by a number of key 
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actions such as the Lucknow Pact with Congress in 1916 and most spectacularly 
Jinnah’s acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946 which would have allowed 
India to stay together as a federal country if substantial powers were transferred to the 
provinces. Jinnah not only accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan, he is on record for 
having torn up the plan for an independent Pakistan literally months before the 
country was actually born. Nehru and eventually the Congress rejected the Cabinet 
Mission Plan no doubt thinking that the price of partition was worth paying to avoid a 
weak centre, which would have resulted from the Cabinet Mission’s model of 
federalism. Nehru’s ambition was to modernize India under a strong centralized state. 
The Congress leadership may also have calculated that Jinnah’s demand for Pakistan 
was a bluff and the time had come to call it or even that if Pakistan was created it 
would soon collapse and return to the Indian union as an unviable economy (Alavi 
1983: 46-7). In the end, what transpired proved to be an extremely costly denouement 
for both sides.  
 
In Pakistan, the result was a rapid descent towards authoritarianism. The Muslim 
League leadership had to abandon its constituency in North India and run territories in 
which it had no political roots. They soon discovered that the regional leaders of 
Pakistan had different priorities. Whether they were originally landlords or rich 
peasants, in the days of united India they were primarily involved in redistributive 
politics using their ability to organize their constituencies to compete for resources 
with the economically more advanced Hindus. Their redistributive demands suddenly 
made far less sense when the old Hindu elites disappeared and resources had to be 
allocated to create a new industrial base. The Muslim League leadership thus 
discovered that to preserve the hastily constructed union and their own survival they 
increasingly had to rely on the bureaucracy. Alavi (1983: 78-9) is therefore probably 
too harsh in attributing the turn towards bureaucratization in early Pakistan largely to 
the poor quality of the political leadership. Yet, the use of bureaucratic methods 
certainly further weakened the political leadership and strengthened the bureaucracy 
and the military.  
 
Thus, ironically, the imperative of industrialization and the need to over-ride the 
regional demands of emerging classes converted the Muslim League from a party of 
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federalism into a party of strong centralism. There are obvious parallels between the 
Muslim League’s responses to regional politicians in the new Pakistan and Nehru’s 
rejection of the Muslim League’s earlier federalist demands. In fact, the Muslim 
League faced a worse predicament than Nehru. Unlike Nehru who had a constituency 
which supported planning, the Muslim League had no such constituency in Pakistan. 
As we have seen, Pakistan was largely a rural hinterland whose politicians were 
primarily regional power brokers. 
 
Already in 1954, the lower-middle classes in East Pakistan who dominated the polity 
(the jotedars in the countryside and the urban petty bourgeoisie) revolted against the 
Muslim League and elected a United Front government. The East Pakistani political 
elite had simply discovered that the Muslim League was not receptive to its demands 
for more autonomy for (and hence local access to state power in) East Pakistan 
(Sayeed, K. 1960 and 1967). The central bureaucracy however quickly suppressed 
political assertion by the class that had won East Bengal for Pakistan. The East 
Pakistan legislative assembly was dismissed and Governor's Rule imposed. These 
political experiences provided the backdrop to the development of the capitalist class 
in the fifties through the policies of import substituting industrialization. 
 
Creating Capitalists through Import Substitution. It was in this context that the 
Muslim League government in the fifties began to look around for a strategy to create 
a new industrial base. The key plank of the early strategy was to push the tiny 
merchant capitalist class many of whom had emigrated from India to become a new 
class of industrialists. The Muslim League leadership had personal contacts with some 
of these émigré traders dating back to pre-partition days. These traders in India in 
alliance with the Muslim League had established ‘Nation Building Companies’ like 
the Mohammadi Steamship Company and Habib Bank Limited, and they provided 
obvious candidates when individuals or companies had to be offered industrial 
projects (Rashid & Gardezi 1983: 1-8). However, Rashid and Gardezi describe this 
phase of Pakistan’s economic policy as a period of mercantilism where trading 
interests were given priority. This interpretation is not consistent with the quite 
explicit objective of the state to create a new industrial capitalist class. It is more 
accurate to describe policy in this phase as attempting to create at least a few 
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industrial capitalists out of the merchant capitalists who were around in early 
Pakistan. Industrialization was induced by rapidly increasing the profitability of 
investing in industry, by providing subsidized funds for investment, and by sharing 
some of the risks of setting up new and untried ventures. These goals were achieved 
through a number of measures. 
 
First, Pakistan decided not to devalue the Pakistan Rupee in line with the Indian 
Rupee when sterling devalued against the dollar in 1949. This effectively overvalued 
the Pakistan Rupee against both the Indian Rupee and the pound to which the latter 
was linked and made it more expensive for India to import raw materials such as 
cotton and jute fibres from Pakistan. At the same time, it made imports of machines 
into Pakistan cheaper, particularly from the sterling area. This provided a strong 
incentive for Pakistani traders to enter industry and to step into the shoes of Calcutta 
and Bombay industrialists. The refusal to devalue was thus an expression of economic 
nationalism. It broke the trade links that the Pakistani regions had with India as an 
agricultural hinterland and provided an important spur for import substituting 
industrialization. As we shall see later, the overvaluation effectively transferred 
resources from agricultural exporters primarily in East Pakistan to industrial 
machinery importers based mostly in the West. 
 
The immediate beneficiaries were the small class of merchant capitalists, many of 
them Gujarati Muslim emigres who had settled in the growing port city of Karachi. 
These emigre merchants had recently acquired substantial wealth through their trading 
activities. The Korean War boom had left large surpluses with these traders that were 
potentially available for investment in industry. The change in relative prices brought 
about by the currency overvaluation now created powerful incentives for using this 
cash to import machinery and to set up import substituting industries. However, an 
overvalued exchange rate makes all imports cheap and all exports expensive. Without 
further intervention, it would have led very soon to a foreign exchange crisis with 
demand for foreign exchange outrunning supply. To counter this, and in common with 
import substituting strategies in other countries, further interventions such as tariffs, 
import licensing and credit allocation were introduced to prevent a balance of 
payments crisis. 
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A differentiated tariff regime was set up which made some imports more expensive 
than others. Differentiated tariffs allow the government to raise the import price of 
goods that can be produced at home. This discourages domestic consumers from 
importing these goods and at the same time encourages them to buy the domestic 
products whose higher prices or lower quality may have prevented them from 
competing with foreign products in the early stages of industrialization. In theory, as 
long as these tariffs can be credibly lowered over time, domestic infant industries are 
given an incentive to set up and mature. From the mid to late fifties, the average rate 
of tariffs in Pakistan was 65 per cent for consumer goods, 40 per cent for intermediate 
goods and 39 per cent for capital goods (Lewis 1969: 74). Thus, the tariff structure 
aimed to promote industrialization in the consumer goods sectors in the first instance.  
 
A third component of import substituting industrialization strategies is usually some 
form of import rationing or licensing. Tariffs can limit the demand for imported 
consumer goods but excess demand is likely to persist for capital goods. After all, the 
point of the overvalued exchange rate is to keep the price of imported machinery low 
for investors. Thus, excess demand for foreign exchange from investors wanting to 
import machinery is likely to persist. As a result, access to foreign exchange for 
importing machinery often has to be rationed directly. The import licensing system 
played a key role here as a mechanism for rationing scarce foreign exchange across 
the different industrialists who wanted to import capital goods.  
 
The bureaucratic mechanisms for implementing a licensing regime already existed. 
Pakistan, like India, inherited a licensing system from British India, which had 
practised import licensing during the war. Importers required a license for all key 
imports. The supply of licenses was in theory centrally controlled so that in principle, 
the state could control who imported and how much they imported. Over the fifties 
import rationing in Pakistan was extended to cover all important imports of machinery 
and raw materials as well as of consumer goods. Although the East Asian states did 
not use the formal mechanism of licensing, the difference was more apparent than 
real. The work of Amsden (1989), Wade (1990) and others suggests that at an 
equivalent stage of industrialization both South Korea and Taiwan used extensive 
state intervention to ration scarce foreign exchange across sectors and often across 
firms. 
 
A fourth component of import substituting industrialization is often the centralized 
allocation of credit through publicly owned financial institutions. When the state has 
credit to disburse, its ability to disburse it to particular sectors or companies can 
determine the structure of the industrial sector and the sequence of industries set up. 
These are critical components of an industrial policy as the later South Korean 
experience was to show. However, in the early phase of import substituting 
industrialization in Pakistan the state did not have the resources to directly allocate 
credit. It did set up two industrial banks, the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment 
Corporation (PICIC) and the Pakistan Industrial Finance Corporation later called 
Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (IDBP), which were to assume much greater 
importance in later years (Alavi 1983: 46-50, Amjad 1983: 235-50). These institutions 
are often referred to in the literature as “development finance institutions” (or DFIs).  
 
Table 3 Foreign Inflows as Percentage of Provincial GDP 
 
1950-55 1955-60 1960 1965 1970
West Pakistan   5.6   6.5   5.4   8.9   3.1
East Pakistan   -1.7  -0.7   0.3   4.6   3.2  
 
 
Note: Foreign inflows for each province include inflows from the other province. The 
outflows from East Pakistan in the fifties were going entirely to West Pakistan. 
 
Source: Haq (1966) Table 16, Amjad (1982) Table 1.3. 
One reason why the state’s allocation of credit through the DFIs or otherwise was 
relatively unimportant in the fifties was that the state had relatively little to distribute. 
Its powers to raise domestic resources through taxation were (and remain) 
underdeveloped. Foreign capital inflows in the form of aid and soft credit were also 
relatively scarce in the fifties. This is shown in Table 3. In the early fifties there were 
significant inflows into West Pakistan but a large part of these were transfers from 
East Pakistan as foreign exchange earned by the agricultural exports of the East were 
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invested in the West. The transfer reduced somewhat over the fifties and terminated 
by 1960. East Pakistan continued to get less than its share of foreign inflows until the 
late sixties. This transfer was to prove to be a powerful symbol which excluded elites 
in the East were eventually to use to mobilize East Pakistani opposition to Pakistan’s 
industrial policy. Unfortunately, Bangladesh achieved its independence just as 
political pressure was shifting the balance of investment in its favour and as a result, it 
lost any chance of recovering the investment it had made in the joint industrialization 
of Pakistan in the decades before that. 
 
What is important is that true foreign inflows (netting out transfers between the 
provinces) were relatively small in the fifties and did not become substantial until the 
mid-sixties. Since an important part of aid and soft loans were allocated domestically 
by the DFIs, it was only in the early to mid-sixties that the state was able to play a 
more important role in directly allocating investible resources through the two 
industrial banks. The early import substituting industrialization in the fifties thus 
relied on other sources of funds for investment. Much of this came from the retained 
profits of the merchant capitalists, which in turn was based on squeezing consumers 
and the agricultural sector (Papanek 1967: 184-225). The squeeze on the agricultural 
sector was particularly important and is partly reflected in the transfer of resources 
from East to West Pakistan. Import substituting industrialization generally squeezes 
agriculture. If the exchange rate in overvalued, agricultural producers have to be 
willing to accept lower rupee prices for their crops. Their sacrifice is converted into 
lower prices for importers of machinery, thereby transferring resources from 
agriculture to industry. 
 
The transfer from agriculture through this mechanism was particularly severe between 
1949 and 1955. In 1955, the rupee was devalued by 30 per cent but even after that, the 
rupee remained substantially overvalued. On top of the exchange rate squeeze, the 
Pakistan government imposed additional export taxes on raw cotton and jute, the two 
major cash crops. Through these two mechanisms, agriculture provided the bulk of 
the surplus for industrialization in the early phase of Pakistan’s industrialization. This 
no doubt contributed to the growing alienation between the political representatives of 
rural vote banks and the state bureaucracy, which was at that time primarily interested 
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in strengthening the industrial base of the country. 
 
The final policy plank of the early industrialization was an institutional innovation of 
the Pakistani state, which allowed it to absorb some of the risks facing emerging 
capitalists. The state in Pakistan recognised at a very early stage that entrepreneurial 
risk-aversion was a major constraint to capitalist industrialization in Pakistan. 
However, instead of developing a large public sector as in India, the Pakistani policy-
makers came up with an innovative solution where the public sector assumed the risk 
of setting up new enterprises but the enterprises developed were sold off at attractive 
prices to private sector individuals as soon as they were up and running. This allowed 
the same group of public sector entrepreneurs to turn over many more enterprises than 
if they had to run them permanently. This solution followed from the poor 
entrepreneurial response received by the government a month after independence 
when an industries conference was convened and various forms of assistance was 
offered to businesspersons. Partly because of this disappointment, in 1952 the 
Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) was set up, with the objective of 
setting up and divesting to private owners new industrial units. The PIDC would 
become a key player in later years (Papanek 1967). 
 
The high industrial growth rates achieved through the fifties (see Table 1) reflect the 
efficacy of these early policies. The very high growth rates of the early fifties are 
statistically exaggerated because of the almost non-existent industry in 1947 in the 
areas that constituted Pakistan (Lewis 1970: 15-16). Nevertheless, growth was high 
even after allowing for this and reflected the success of these policies in maintaining 
profitability in the emerging industrial sector at very high levels. Papanek (1967: 39) 
reports that profit rates were as high as 50-100 per cent in industry in the early fifties, 
declining to 20-50 per cent by the late fifties. These incentives had the desired effect 
and merchants fell over each other to invest in industry (Papanek 1967, Lewis 1969, 
1970, Lewis & Soligo 1965 and Amjad 1982). There was a rapid growth particularly 
in consumer good industries such as oil processing, rice milling and food 
manufacturing which were generally not capital-intensive and which mostly involved 
low risks. On the other hand, there was also some development of more capital-
intensive intermediate industries such as textiles through the fifties.  
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However, this success should not be overstated. Table 2 shows that even in 1960, the 
share of large scale manufacturing industry had only increased to five per cent of 
GNP while agriculture still accounted for 53.3 per cent (Ahmad & Amjad 1984: 4). 
Moreover, by the late fifties, easy import substituting possibilities had been exhausted 
and the industrial growth rate began to decline sharply (see Table 1). The industrial 
sector needed a more targeted policy regime to sustain further growth, to increase 
investments in better and more sophisticated technologies and to persuade the early 
industrialists to upgrade their technologies and improve productivity. The problem 
was not that the economy necessarily needed to move into more capital intensive 
industries or into the production of capital goods. It was rather that further 
industrialization involved greater risks and required more targeted allocations of 
capital for longer periods as new expertise had to be acquired and new markets 
captured. This held true not only for capital goods industries but also for more 
sophisticated consumer goods industries. And yet, at the very moment when simple 
consumer goods had been mastered and the industrial sector was ready to move into 
more risky investments, the country faced a growing political crisis.  
 
Economic historians who have examined the political impasse before the military 
coup of October 1958 have often tended to impose inappropriate categories on the 
conflict. For instance, Amjad (1983: 206-10) explains the crisis in terms of a conflict 
between the West Pakistani 'feudal oligarchy’ who dominated the Constituent 
Assembly and the bureaucracy imported from British India who he claims were the 
agents of the bourgeoisie. The large West Pakistani landlords were undoubtedly over-
represented in the Constituent Assembly, just as the jotedar dominated the East 
Pakistan Legislative Assembly. But like the jotedar voice in the East, the 'landed 
interests’ of the West were not primarily interested in rural issues let alone feudalism. 
The conflict between the 'feudal oligarchy’ of West Pakistan and the primarily jotedar 
representatives from East Pakistan was about the weight of representation of each 
wing in the central legislature. This was a critically important issue because it would 
determine the political power of these aspiring regional “middle class” groups 
demanding access to the surplus allocated by the state. Whatever their agrarian 
origins, neither of these groups of politicians showed any legislative interest in the 
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fate of agriculture. Thus, the claim that there was a growing conflict between “feudal” 
political representatives and emerging capitalists represented by the bureaucracy is 
not entirely accurate. 
 
Alavi (1983) rightly criticizes the description of the West Pakistani political 
representatives as feudal. However, he explains the shift to authoritarianism in 1958 
in terms of the 'structural imperative of peripheral capitalism’. But while Alavi is right 
in pointing out that emerging capitalism in developing countries is different from the 
capitalism that developed in the early developers, Alavi does not have an analytical 
model telling us what the structural imperatives of ‘peripheral capitalism’ really are 
apart from the fact that they eventually lead to the military-bureaucratic takeover. A 
similar imperative towards military takeover does not seem to have operated in India. 
It would be more accurate to say that the opportunities created for a military takeover 
in Pakistan compared to India were due to a combination of a much more serious 
distributive crisis created by competing demands from non-capitalist classes at a 
much earlier stage of development and a weaker political organization for 
institutionally organizing accommodation. Add to this the perception amongst key 
military and bureaucratic leaders that industrialization was essential for the country’s 
political survival and we have the ingredients for a sufficient explanation of the shift 
towards authoritarianism. An ambitious general could seize power and could rely on 
the tacit support of nationalist bureaucrats and politicians. 
 
Thus by the late fifties two parallel processes were working to bring to a close the first 
stage of import substituting industrialization. On the one hand, there were economic 
factors such as the exhaustion of easy substitution possibilities and the need to 
progress into more risky ventures that needed new economic policies and appropriate 
state institutions. Secondly, at the very moment that industrialization was moving into 
a more difficult phase, political challenges from indigenous intermediate classes who 
had been effectively excluded from these processes were also coming to a head. 
Governor’s rule in various parts of the country was not leading to political quiescence 
but its reverse. Yet, political stability was a precondition for working out any 
institutional solutions to the pressing economic problems.   
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The military-bureaucratic leaders responsible for the October 1958 coup were very 
clear in their own minds about the importance of political peace and the need to 
suppress the demands of the political classes if industrial accumulation was to 
continue. Behind the coup were several powerful bureaucrats, men like Ghulam 
Mohammad, Chaudhri Mohammed Ali and Iskandar Mirza, in whose perception, the 
state faced a stark choice. If it conceded to the demands of the political 
representatives, they feared the politicians would be unable to resolve their 
distributive conflicts and the bulk of the country’s investible resources would be 
absorbed by these political coalitions at the cost of industrialization. On the other 
hand, they clearly understood that political suppression carried grave risks of its own. 
In October 1958, they chose to go down the second route encouraging and supporting 
General Ayub Khan’s bid for power. 
 
3. The 1960s: Military Takeover and Industrial Policy  
While the October coup was in the first place a response to a political crisis, the 
temporary cessation of distributive conflicts that followed allowed new responses to 
the economic problems facing the country. It is instructive to compare the evolution 
of industrial policy in Pakistan with the parallel processes unfolding in South Korea 
where a similar coup took place in 1961. In both countries, economic experiments 
after the coup led to a similar evolution towards industrial policy. However, the South 
Korean coup consolidated the state in a society where intermediate classes were weak 
to start with. As a result, the institutions of the state could continue to coordinate 
industrial policy allocations over a sustained period of almost three decades (Amsden 
1989: 147, Kim & Ma 1997).  
 
In Pakistan, the early experience of the benefits of state coordination under the 
military regime led to a very similar set of policies and institutions for state-led 
industrialization. The Ayub regime, like Park Chung Hee’s in South Korea, was 
committed to the development of capitalism. Neither leader saw any contradiction in 
using the state in detailed interventions to achieve this goal. Thus we would argue that 
Gardezi & Rashid’s (1983: 4-11) description of the sixties as a period of 'laissez faire’ 
does not square with the evidence. 
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The real contrast between Pakistan and South Korea is in the way in which politics 
and policy evolved in the two countries. The intermediate classes who had been 
temporarily bypassed by the 1958 coup in Pakistan did not remain quiescent for long. 
The 1962 constitution legitimized for a time the subordination of the powerful middle 
class and emerging middle class factions. Their voices were temporarily overwhelmed 
by the voices of those lower down the social structure through the electoral rules of 
Ayub’s Basic Democracy experiment. This allowed for a time the allocation of huge 
resources to a very small group of industrialists. This in turn allowed very rapid 
accumulation and industrial growth. It was this rapid accumulation rather than the 
effects of a limited liberalization of the licensing system that drove the impressive 
industrial boom of the early sixties. However, by the mid-sixties the intermediate 
classes had to be accommodated once again with important consequences for the 
implementation and sustainability of industrial policy. 
 
Liberalization. The liberalization and decontrol that happened in the early sixties was 
not insignificant. The items imported on license declined from 90.3% of total imports 
in 1960/61 to 39.5% by 1964/65 (Amjad 1982: 39). It became easier for 
businesspersons to import raw materials and capacity utilization increased. The 
overvalued exchange rate had become a problem because there was a growing 
manufacturing sector whose exports were being hampered by the overvaluation. 
Instead of devaluing, Ayub’s regime devised the ingenious solution of multiple 
exchange rates by giving exporters of manufactured goods an “export bonus” in the 
form of a bonus voucher that was effectively an additional claim on foreign exchange. 
These measures induced an investment boom in the early sixties and exports of 
manufactured products such as jute textiles rapidly increased. 
 
The Role of Accumulation. The driving force behind the acceleration of industrial 
growth in the early sixties was simply rapid investment, which in turn was made 
possible by the centralized allocation of investible resources to selected industrial 
investors. In the space of a couple of years, the regime developed, through a process 
of trial and error, the incentives and credit allocations which economists describe as 
industrial policy. The distinctive feature of industrial policy is that specific sectors or 
even business houses are targeted for support to accelerate the process of 
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industrialization and technology acquisition.  
 
Industrial policy therefore requires either a degree of social consensus that these 
policies are in the common interest or it requires a state that is able to override the 
resistance of those who oppose its allocations. The industrial policies that emerged in 
both Pakistan and South Korea were initially based on social exclusion rather than 
consensus. The militaristic forms of the governments that emerged in these countries 
in the early sixties played a critical role in allowing the two states to do this. 
 
An indirect measure of the success with which industrial policy in Pakistan directed 
resources to the new (and tiny) class of big capitalists is provided by the huge 
concentration of wealth which soon emerged in the industrial sector. This evidence is 
usually presented as an indication of the failure of industrial policy. In fact since this 
is exactly what the regime was intending to achieve, the figures for concentration give 
us an indication of the success of the policy in directing resources to the small class of 
capitalists. Of course, resources could have been targeted to a broader group of 
capitalists and indeed the Second Plan and Third Plans, which covered the sixties, 
paid lip service to the objectives of maintaining regional and inter-sectoral balances. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of any attempt to find and cultivate a broader capitalist 
class, the growing concentration reflects the rapid investment going on in industry.  
 
The Pakistani economist Mahbub-ul-Haq, who used the phrase functional inequality 
to describe the social utility of an initial period of inequality, provided the 
justification. In an argument that would have appeared attractive to a later generation 
of production-oriented Marxists like Bill Warren, Haq argued that capitalist growth 
required the re-investment of profits and large profits implied an initial period of 
inequality. Redistribution and welfare could be (indeed had to be) postponed until a 
later date. This identified Haq with the trickle down school although his work was 
extremely sophisticated for his time. It is important to note that Haq’s argument was 
to defend some initial income inequality not to defend a huge concentration of 
industrial assets in a few hands. In other words, Haq saw no necessity for large scale 
production or of economies of scale that would have justified in addition a 
concentration of asset ownership. 
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By the late sixties, the same Haq was so appalled by the extent of asset concentration 
in Pakistan that he coined another phrase that was to have wide-ranging repercussions 
in Pakistani politics. Using Planning Commission data, (which has still not been made 
public) he described the beneficiaries of industrial policy resource allocation as the 22 
Families who in 1968 apparently controlled 66% of Pakistan’s industrial wealth. A 
more careful study by Amjad later suggested that the top 18 groups controlled 35% of 
industrial assets while the top 44 controlled around 50% (Amjad 1982: 47). This asset 
concentration was due to a combination of two things. First, Pakistan was adopting 
industries that typically benefited from large scale production because of economies 
of scale. These were industries like cotton and jute textiles, cement, chemical 
industries, and so on. The type of technologies Pakistan was adopting is indicated by 
the studies of capital-labour ratios done in the sixties. A.R. Khan (1970) found that 
the capital-labour ratios in most manufacturing sectors in 1962 were higher in 
Pakistan than in Japan! A similar study by Rizwanul Islam (1976) for 1969 reached 
the same conclusion. Thus, the small scale sector was virtually absent in the new 
technologies that were being adopted through the allocation of credit and licenses 
through industrial policy.  
 
But a second factor behind these concentration figures was the allocation of the bulk 
of state controlled loans to a small number of families. This may have been justified if 
managerial skills were in very short supply and if the particular families were able to 
meet this shortage because of their longer entrepreneurial experience. It is very likely 
that the actual concentration of lending to these families was more than could be 
justified by their greater entrepreneurial skills though this would be difficult to 
empirically test.  
 
Whatever the reasons, between 1958 and the breakdown of industrial policy in 1970, 
the larger of the two industrial banks (the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment 
Corporation) lent 45% of its loans to 13 monopoly houses. The smaller industrial 
bank (the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan that concentrated on smaller 
loans) lent 32% of its loans to 30 monopoly houses (Amjad 1982: Table 2.6). While 
these state owned industrial banks only allocated about a fifth of industrial investment 
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funds over this period, the private banks did not contribute to a widening industrial 
ownership structure either. In fact, of the 17 privately owned banks, seven were 
directly under the control of the very same large business houses. 
 
Concentration versus the Absence of Conditionalities for Subsidies. The 
important question is whether industrial concentration contributed to the economic 
slowdown of the late sixties. This is an important question since a number of 
subsequent Pakistani economists including Amjad (1982) identify the industrial 
concentration as a major contributor to the subsequent slowdown. An alternative 
explanation is that the slowdown happened because subsidies were effectively being 
given to the capitalist sector without any conditions. The simple concentration 
argument draws on textbook neoclassical models where concentration and market 
power can result in inefficient pricing policies by monopolistic firms. As an 
explanation for declining growth, this argument does not stand up if there are 
significant economies of scale in these industries. 
 
However, it could be argued that monopoly power can also reduce the incentives for 
technical progress and quality improvement which competition induces. This is where 
the conditionalities imposed by the state on subsidy recipients become important. 
There is no necessary connection between domestic concentration and competition 
because large firms can be induced to vigorously compete by exposing them to 
international competition. Moreover, competition can also be promoted by 
encouraging vigorous competition in the domestic market. Comparing Pakistan with 
India and South Korea shows the importance of this point. 
 
Both India and South Korea had concentration ratios that were very high, comparable 
to those in Pakistan although strictly comparable figures are hard to come by. In India, 
the Dutt Committee reported in 1969 that in terms of licenses awarded, the top 73 
industrial houses accounted for 56% of the total proposed private corporate sector 
investment in machinery and 60% of its investment in capital goods (which includes 
buildings etc) (Datt and Sundharam 1991: 142). These figures are based on licenses 
and not actual ownership and only cover the private corporate sector so they are not 
comparable to the Pakistani data. But they do show a substantial intended industrial 
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concentration by the Indian planners quite similar to that observed in Pakistan. 
 
On the other hand, it is difficult to sustain the argument that concentration always 
induces inefficiency when we look at South Korea. Asset figures for industrial 
concentration are not available for South Korea but according to Amsden the sales of 
the top 10 chaebol (family owned holding companies) in 1974 accounted for 15.1 % 
of GNP. This figure grew to 67.4% of GNP by 1984 (Amsden 1989: 116). Given 
South Korea’s rapid industrial growth over the seventies, these figures show that an 
astounding growth in concentration nevertheless did not constrain growth. Clearly, 
concentration by itself does not necessarily result in poor performance. Indeed, the 
South Korean case shows that industrial enterprises in sectors that benefit from 
economies of scale clearly benefit from concentration.  
 
In South Korea, concentration did not result in inefficiency because it did not prevent 
the intense competition of the chaebol with international competitors. The state was 
able to induce this competition by making export growth a condition of subsidies. It 
was able to do this by demonstrating that it was able to withdraw subsidies from 
chaebol if it wished, for failure to export or for any other reason. Clearly, the power 
of the state to make this type of threat credible was the distinguishing feature of the 
South Korean state and its industrial policy (Khan 1989, 1996a). In contrast, the 
inability of both the Pakistan and Indian states to give conditional subsidies resulted 
in poor performance accompanying the growth in industrial concentration.  
 
Sectorally Targeted Investments. When a state can impose conditions on the 
recipients of subsidies, one of these conditions can be that the resources are invested 
in particular sectors or in particular technologies. The ability of the South Korean 
state to discipline its chaebol is closely related to a second distinguishing feature of its 
industrial policy. Over the sixties its industrial policy evolved by becoming more 
targeted. The state increasingly used its power to allocate resources to allocate them to 
high technology sectors. Sectoral policy reached its peak under their Heavy and 
Chemical Industry Promotion Plan that was formally adopted in 1973. The state 
became involved in detailed imperative planning where particular sectors were 
prioritized. Following the work of Alice Amsden and others, this period has come to 
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characterize the high point of South Korean industrial policy interventionism. Despite 
the eventual problems which South Korea’s industrial and financial sectors were to 
face in the nineties, there is no doubt that state-led industrial policy was a key factor 
behind its success in organizing rapid industrial accumulation and growth in the 
sixties, seventies and into the eighties.  
 
There is no evidence that the Pakistan state ever acquired a similar degree of control 
over sectoral allocation. It published investment schedules, which publicized desired 
investments in different sectors, but there were no sanctions for excessive investment 
in some sectors and under-investment in others. It should be said that the South 
Korean regime did not invent all these features overnight or at the very outset. It 
groped towards a system that paid large dividends over a period of almost three 
decades. The real question is why the evolution of the Pakistani system took it in such 
a different direction. Why did the leaders of the state not understand that by 
monitoring what they were allocating they could generate much larger dividends for 
the country, for the capitalists and even for themselves in the form of bribes or 
kickbacks from rapidly growing profits? 
 
Changes in the Political Context. It would be wrong to attribute the evolution of 
Pakistan’s industrial policy to policy failures at the leadership level alone. We also 
have to look for constraints that may have prevented the leadership from moving in 
the direction of the South Korean model. In fact, by the mid-sixties, serious cracks 
were appearing in the very foundations of Pakistan's industrial policy regime. The 
state's ability to even sustain the allocation of credit and foreign exchange to the old 
groups was rapidly declining and there was no question of a sustained deepening of 
the industrial policy regime by enforcing the allocation of conditional credit to 
identified high technology sectors. It is at this point that we begin to see the steep 
decline in industrial growth rates in Pakistan in the late sixties (Table 1 above). 
 
From the mid sixties onwards, the Ayub regime faced a growing and increasingly 
powerful resistance from excluded social groups demanding accommodation and 
inclusion. Political mobilization against Ayub began to be organized in West Pakistan 
from around 1967 by Bhutto under the banner of Islamic Socialism. Bhutto’s newly 
 28
articulated ideology was used to challenge the concentrated allocations of resources 
which industrial policy had entailed. The battle was joined shortly afterwards by 
Mujib-ur-Rahman in East Pakistan under the banner of Bengali nationalism. He too 
challenged the concentration of industrial resources in the hands of the emerging 
capitalists who happened to be almost entirely non-Bengali. These changes in the 
political environment were extremely important in determining the efficiency of 
interventions and allocations at the micro level which industrial policy required.  
 
As a result of the growing political contestation which emerged from the mid-sixties 
onwards, allocations under the plans were increasingly made not to the capitalists who 
had the greatest chance of success but to capitalists who had the most significant 
political connections in the sense that their political patrons needed to be 
accommodated for the sake of political stability. Industrial policy increasingly became 
part of the process of political containment rather than of economic planning. Because 
of this, even the existing capitalist sector was soon affected. The possibility of 
monitoring and imposing discipline on the established capitalists steeply declined. 
This is because as rational political actors, even potentially efficient capitalists had 
strong incentives to cultivate political patrons after which they were effectively 
protected from any questioning about the use they made of the subsidized resources 
allocated to them.  
 
As provincial and regional political fragmentation grew over the sixties, it became 
increasingly easy for individual capitalists to find and cultivate competing factions of 
politicians each of whom would protect “their” capitalists, no doubt in exchange for 
“campaign finances”. Thus, productivity could not be forced up even in the industries 
already set up by threatening to withdraw subsidies. Threats of subsidy withdrawal 
are not likely to be either credible or feasible when they and other centrally allocated 
rights are allocated according to political criteria (see Khan 1996a, 1996b, 1997, 
1998a for an analysis of these and related issues and for comparative evidence).  
 
Changing Political Constraints versus Cutbacks in Aid-Financed Investments. 
The changing political context had immediate implications for the state’s ability even 
to continue allocating resources in the old way to the big capitalists. This is important 
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to establish since the slowdown of industrial growth has also been attributed to a 
decline in investments in the late sixties due to a cutback in aid. Thus, Amjad (1982) 
argues that industrialization slowed down because of a decline in aid and soft credit 
inflows into Pakistan that in turn led to a decline in industrial investments. 
 
It is undoubtedly true that Pakistan suffered from a cutback in aid in the mid-sixties. 
In fact following the 1965 war with India both Pakistan and India suffered cutbacks in 
aid. In Pakistan, this affected the flow of resources through the industrial banks or 
DFIs that had a knock-on effect on industrial investment. We see some evidence in 
support of this thesis when we look at the figures for industrial investment in West 
Pakistan. In West Pakistan industrial investment peaked in 1965 and then suffered an 
approximately 25% drop in the late sixties in real terms. However, a more complex 
story emerges when we include East Pakistan in the picture. The total industrial 
investment for Pakistan does not suffer an equivalent drop according to Amjad’s own 
figures shown in Table 4. What seems to be happening in the late sixties in terms of 
these figures is extremely interesting and is surprisingly not commented on in the 
economic literature of either Pakistan or contemporary Bangladesh.  
 
 Table 4. Industrial Investment in East and West Pakistan 1961-70 
 (Million Rupees in Constant 1960 Prices)
 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
W Pak 852.94 846.15 757.05 1062.50 1221.43 1087.96 987.16 1013.79 916.87 1061.36  
%Public    
Sector  
5.1 3.9 15.6 3.2 9.8 10.8 10.9 11.6 8.3  3.2 
E Pak 205.99 459.42 332.21 382.30 450.21 390.00 477.02 799.81 796.84 700.88  
%Public 
  Sector 
21.7  13.8 29.8 24.3 24.3 25.0 24.8 53.0 50.7 45.7 
 
All Pak 1058.9 1305.6 1089.3 1444.8 1671.6 1478.0 1464.2 1813.6 1713.7 1762.2 
 
 Source: Amjad (1982) Table A.9 
 
From around 1967, which is the year when provincial conflicts suddenly escalate, the 
central government started to shift a significant proportion of industrial investments to 
East Pakistan in response to the growing political pressure from the East. History was 
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to show that it was too little and too late. What is interesting is that the re-allocation 
had begun as early as 1967 and on a significant scale. 
 
If the aid-based explanation of the industrial slowdown were correct, we would expect 
to see a general drop in industrial investment in the late sixties. Instead, total 
investment does not fall and indeed reaches a peak in 1968. What we do see is a 
significant regional re-allocation of the total investment. Can this be related to the 
industrial slowdown? A change in investment allocation across regions does not in 
itself explain why there should have been a drop in performance. A possible 
explanation is suggested by the figures for the public sector. Two decades of neglect 
had meant that East Pakistan did not have many entrepreneurs yet political pressure 
from the East was powerful enough to result in a rapid relocation of new investments. 
Since Bengali entrepreneurs were not forthcoming the share of the public sector shot 
up in East Pakistan. Not only was there a bigger pot of investment going to East 
Pakistan (for the first time approaching parity with West Pakistan which was still 
slightly smaller in terms of population), but also around half of these investments 
were in the public sector. By and large these public sector investments were usually 
capital-intensive. Such investments have long gestation periods and the bunching of 
new start-ups in the late sixties could be one reason why industrial output declined 
despite overall investment being maintained. 
 
Despite the importance of the public sector, which indicates the weakness of the 
Bengali bourgeoisie, a new Bengali bourgeoisie was rapidly being created. By 1971, 
one study found sixteen major Bengali business houses, each with assets of more than 
Rs. 25 million, and with combined assets of nearly Rs. 700 million (S. Baranov, cited 
in Sobhan 1980: 15). The bulk of the nascent industrial bourgeoisie was, however, 
small to medium entrepreneurs. Excluding the large jute and textile industries, state 
financial institutions had, by 1971 given over 3000 loans to Bengalis, mostly below 
Rs. 400,000 each, helping to set up around 1300 units (Sobhan & Ahmad 1980: 64-5). 
 
Inevitably, some of the new Bengali entrepreneurs were political entrepreneurs or 
entrepreneurs with strong political linkages. After all, the sudden shift in investment 
philosophy had been clearly driven by politics and not by a reassessment of economic 
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strategy. In an extremely perceptive description, Hamza Alavi calls the emerging 
class of new men in East Pakistan in the late sixties the “contactors” as distinct from 
the ubiquitous class of small entrepreneurs who are known in the subcontinent as 
contractors who mainly engage in small scale construction projects (Alavi 1973: 169-
70). Unlike the contractors, the contactors were entrepreneurs whose source of power 
was their “contact” with someone in politics. The contactors represented in a pure 
form the use of political power to accumulate economic resources. The resources 
going to this class in the late sixties were probably almost entirely a waste. A few did 
eventually accumulate enough and were to become the big capitalists of independent 
Bangladesh. But in most cases, the diversion of investible resources to this emerging 
class of political entrepreneurs must be part of the explanation for the slowdown in 
overall industrial growth in the late sixties.  
 
Conditionalities Revisited: The Role of Politics. The picture of increasing political 
contestation can help to explain a more important feature of Pakistan’s industrial 
policy. We have already seen that the imposition of conditionalities for subsidy 
recipients was never attempted in Pakistan or indeed anywhere in the Indian 
subcontinent. Yet, in principle a state that is trying to maximize economic growth (or 
even its own wealth in the form of bribes) should by a process of trial and error 
discover that growth is enhanced by allocating resources in particular ways and with 
particular conditions. The political context suggests an obvious reason why this kind 
of thinking did not emerge in leading planning circles. If the exercise of political 
power can lead to the reallocation of vast sums of investment as we have seen in the 
case of the unfolding East-West conflict in Pakistan, it can also prevent the imposition 
of discipline on individual capitalists. We now examine how capitalists as rational 
economic and political players took full advantage of the political situation to protect 
their private interests.  
 
Stanley Kochanek (1983) examines the persistent and growing politicization of 
capitalists in Pakistan by looking at the internal politics of the Pakistan Chambers of 
Commerce in the fifties, sixties and beyond. From the very beginning of the Ayub 
regime, the potential of political opposition was a consistent worry for the leadership. 
Ayub responded to this using both the carrot of buying off those who would promise 
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to be quiescent as well as the stick of repression. The latter, however, was soon 
recognized as implausible given the disposition of forces between a relatively weak 
state apparatus and a potentially well organized middle class that could easily 
mobilize broader social protest. Thus, even after the 1958 coup, the practice of 
distributing licenses (to import or invest) to political entrepreneurs to “buy them off” 
continued. These entrepreneurs were mostly Pathans and Punjabis in West Pakistan, 
suggesting that the tradition of contactors was neither new nor East Pakistani, 
although there was clearly a major new irruption of contactors in East Pakistan in the 
late sixties. The early West Pakistani contactors would sell on their licenses to 
businesses, thereby capitalizing their organizational power (Kochanek 1983: 264, 
Feldman 1972: 204). 
 
In this context, business developed a very specific pattern of organization both in 
terms of relationships with each other and with the state. The big capitalists preferred 
initially to develop personalized contacts with patrons in the state bureaucracy and the 
highest political leadership consisting of Ayub and his close associates. Later on, 
these capitalists would become the sole political base for Ayub’s rule, financing his 
party and providing resources for his politics. Such a close nexus between top 
business and political leaders is also apparent in the South Korea of the time with a 
similar sharing of rents between the two groups. In Pakistan, however, from the 
beginning there is another category of medium sized entrepreneurs who are more 
active in the business and trade associations and who are adept at using their close ties 
and affinities with local political movements, parties and organizations to press their 
demands. This group numerically dominates the trade associations, which the Ayub 
regime tried to set up in the early sixties. Although economically weak, they are not 
politically weak, and the big groups cannot dominate them in the trade associations.  
 
The political power of the medium and small enterprises is shown by the strategies 
they followed to further their interests. The politics of their associations was 
extremely fractious. Economically weaker groups of entrepreneurs strongly resisted 
the Ayub regime’s attempts to create unified national business associations where 
their power was more likely to be proportional to their economic strength. The weaker 
groups always resisted this because they felt that with separate representation they 
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would be able to make demands in proportion to the political power of the groups 
they had allied with, even if their economic power was currently small. This was as 
true of smaller business groups in West Pakistan as it was of the East Pakistani bloc. 
However, the importance of the East-West divide dominated all other conflicts 
between business groups because of its potentially explosive implications for the 
country. Subsequently, the history of both Pakistan and Bangladesh shows the 
continuing politicization and fractiousness of business in these countries. To push 
their particular cases, competing business groups in both countries continue to ally 
themselves with whatever competing regional or (in the case of Bangladesh) 
ideological identities are current (Kochanek 1983: 122-171).  
 
The East Pakistan case shows that these strategies were rational for the sectional 
interests who follow them. East Pakistani contactors got huge windfalls as a result of 
their association with the growing regional movement in East Pakistan. The scale of 
the resource shift to East Pakistan shown in Table 4 captures the significance of this 
type of politics. We argue that this political context is important to understand the 
total absence of conditionalities for subsidized loan recipients amongst the big 
capitalists. As the sixties progressed, the Ayub regime became increasingly politically 
dependant on the support and acquiescence of the big business interests it had helped 
to create. Their finances were essential for the regime and it could not afford to lose 
the last remaining bastion of support. If the regime antagonized any particular big 
business group too much it would clearly threaten to ally itself with one or other of 
the many regional and ideological movements which had begun to oppose the regime.  
 
In this context, it is hardly surprising that the Ayubite industrial policy did not 
progress in the South Korean fashion to become stricter in its conditionality let alone 
to become more ambitious in directing resources to particular sectors. The big 
business allies of the regime had to be kept happy and this meant that the stick could 
not be used. At the same time the carrots available for them were shrinking because 
emerging middle classes had to be accommodated on a massive scale by the late 
sixties (the East Pakistani contactors being only one example). Despite such 
accommodation, the country was inexorably descending towards political disaster and 
the entire Ayubite policy structure collapsed with the descent into civil war and the 
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independence of Bangladesh in 1971. 
 
In providing this explanation, we have not addressed the features of Indian history 
that explain the relative power of its “middle classes”, nor can a satisfactory 
discussion be attempted here. Several distinctive features of Indian society can 
however be noted in passing. On the one hand, the relative political weakness of 
capitalists and workers in the Indian subcontinent at the end of the colonial period 
reflected the industrial under-development of India to a much greater extent than was 
the case in the East Asian states. On the other hand, elites whose power was based on 
positions they occupied within the formal and informal colonial administrative 
structure were relatively much more powerful. The competing claims of these elites 
during the colonial period and the manner in which they were accommodated 
established a tradition of political activity that has lasted well into the post-colonial 
period.  
 
Competing groups from within the emerging middle classes in the Indian 
subcontinent continue to organize on the basis of a wide variety of emotive symbols 
including language, caste and religion to demand preferential subsidies, access to jobs 
and so on. Politics based on these symbols has not enriched the vast majority of the 
populations of these countries but has enabled successive layers of emerging middle 
class groups to get access to public resources on the basis of their ability to organize 
much more numerous groups below them. At the same time, those who happened to 
be in power have always found it necessary to organize transfers to the most 
vociferous of the excluded groups in ongoing processes of accommodation and 
incorporation (Khan 1989). 
 
In stark contrast to the Indian subcontinent, the colonial impact of the Japanese in 
North East Asia left a society with relatively weak intermediate classes and no 
tradition of political accommodation in response to pressure. Japanese colonialism 
destroyed the potential of a new middle class emerging from the countryside by 
destroying the rentier landlord class. It also ran its colonies with far fewer concessions 
to the political demands of local power blocs (Kohli 1994). Unlike the British, the 
Japanese were able to do this because of their numerical dominance over their much 
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smaller colonies as well as their geographical proximity. An unintended and certainly 
unforeseen consequence of this strategy was that competing factions within 
indigenous middle classes remained relatively weak in these countries. Later on in the 
post-colonial period, this allowed their states to remain isolated for a lot longer from 
the need to accommodate organizationally powerful groups from within the middle 
and lower middle classes (Khan 1989).  
 
Thus it was the nature of the links between politics and economics that made Pakistan 
significantly different from South Korea. In the East Asian countries, the centrifugal 
growth of competing opposition groups did not emerge till the end of the seventies 
and even then it did so in a much more muted form. By then the foundations for a 
viable capitalist economy had been established in the East Asian countries and a 
mature capitalist class had emerged who no longer required differentiated assistance 
and support to the same degree as before. Most importantly, by the eighties the 
successful East Asian industrializers had graduated to the ranks of the advanced 
industrial countries, even if like the advanced industrial countries they are subject to 
occasional structural crises and bouts of recession. 
 
Conclusion  
An examination of the Pakistan industrial policy experiment of the sixties leads us to 
ask if the strategy failed because of policy errors or because of some deeper 
incompatibility of the policy with the underlying social structure of the country. We 
have argued that simple policy error explanations either of the liberal (too-much-
intervention) or of the statist (too-little-monitoring) types are not convincing. 
Explanations which stress structural features such as industrial concentration or 
contingent shocks like the decline of aid are also not convincing on their own. But 
does the social structure of the subcontinental countries doom them to low growth and 
bouts of political upheaval?  
 
Such a conclusion may be too pessimistic. But our analysis certainly does suggest that 
simple answers are unlikely to be found in either renewed attempts to create a new 
political consensus or in liberalization. The Ayub regime tried to change its political 
constraints to make politics more compatible with its economic strategy. Ayub’s 
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attempt to over-ride political constraints clearly failed and the country eventually 
descended into civil war. The political basis of this failure and the ability of emerging 
middle class groups to consolidate around ever newer symbols is an experience that 
needs to be carefully studied. It has potentially important lessons for the emerging 
consensus within sections of the Indian elite that a unified national identity based 
perhaps on “Hinduism” may enable the Indian state to overcome a parallel structural 
sclerosis. The Pakistan experience shows that ideology, constitutional change and 
substantial amounts of force are not sufficient to change patterns of upward mobility 
in the Indian subcontinent.  
 
In contrast, the current phase of liberalization in the Indian subcontinent may be 
described as one of changing the economic strategy to make it more compatible with 
political constraints. It is possible to interpret liberalization as a strategy of state 
withdrawal given the political failure to implement intervention efficiently. While this 
makes some sense, there is also a sense in which liberalization is self-defeating. 
Political stability ultimately depends on growth and the satisfaction of demands and 
aspirations. Stability will not be achieved for long if these economies do not grow 
rapidly. While liberalization has improved the prospects of growth in the short-run by 
removing the worst irrationalities of centralized attempts at resource allocation, it has 
also harmed long-run prospects by encouraging these countries to move into small-
scale, low value-added sectors. Through the eighties, Pakistan has moved into lower 
quality cotton textiles and garments, diamond polishing has emerged as one of India’s 
major export “industries” and the garment industry has established itself as the 
miracle industry of Bangladesh. 
 
If our analysis of the political constraints on subcontinental states is roughly correct, it 
suggests that these states are not going to be too good at monitoring and disciplining 
large-scale industries if the rest of society is going to concentrate on contesting the 
associated allocations of resources all the time. This does not mean that these states 
can do nothing to ensure that high technology industries are adopted. There are plenty 
of industries such as electronics, which are relatively small-scale, and yet are high 
technology and high value-adding industries. Such industries are likely to be 
politically more viable in the Indian subcontinent as they entail the creation of a 
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widely dispersed but high value-adding capitalist class. But these industries are 
unlikely to spontaneously appear without the coordination of investment plans, 
technology acquisition licensing and credible assurances being given to foreign 
investors. States can play a big part in all this as they have done in Taiwan or 
Malaysia. The challenge is to identify strategies that can promote long-run growth and 
for which the political support of a large enough group of the population can be found 
to counter the perennial political pressures constraining the ability of the state to 
organize development.  
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